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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
H A R O L D K. B E E C H E R &
A S S O C I A T E S , INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.

\ Case No.
13610

SALT LAKE CITY
C O R P O R A T I O N and
SALT L A K E COUNTY,
Defendants-Respondents.

Brief of Defendants-Respondents
Salt Lake City Corporation and
Salt Lake County

N A T U R E OF CASE
The plaintiff-appellant commenced this action in
the lower court to recover the sum of $130,079.45 from
the defendants-respondents for additional architect's
fees allegedly owing to the plaintiff-appellant as a result of the construction of the Metropolitan Hall of
Justice in Salt Lake City, Utah.
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D I S P O S I T I O N O F CASE
BY L O W E R COURT
A t the pretrial hearing, the defendants-respondents
moved for summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings and dismissal of plaintiff-appellant's amended
complaint as a matter of law. After ten months during
which the plaintiff-appellant filed no response to the
written memoranda of the defendants below, the lower
court granted judgment in favor of defendants-respondents of no cause of action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendants-respondents seek to have the lower
court's Judgment dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint affirmed and costs awarded to them.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The undisputed facts as shown by the pleadings,
discovery and the record in this case are as follows:
1. By substantially identical agreements dated
March 1, 1960 and May 20, 1960, Salt Lake City Corporation and Salt Lake County contracted with Harold
K. Beecher & Associates, a Utah corporation, for it to
provide architectural services in connection with the
construction of a proposed Public Safety and Jail
Building. (See Exhibits I and I I I attached to the
Amended Complaint, R. 27-33, 36-44).
2
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2. During the period from January 1, 1960 to
October 6, 1960, the architect prepared preliminary
drawings, outline specifications and cost estimates relating to a proposed "High Rise Building", which
plans were never approved by the city or county. (See
items No. 1 and No. 2 of the Detailed Statement attached as Exhibit V I to the Amended Complaint, R.
47-49, and defendant-respondent Salt Lake City Corporation's Request for Admission of Fact No. 10 admitted by plaintiff-respondent, R. 222, 223, 229).
3. As a result of the disapproval of the preliminary
plans for a "High Rise Building", the architect entered
into supplemental agreements with the City on November 10,1960, and the County on December 30, 1960.
(See Exlibits I I and I V attached to the Amended
Complaint, R. 34-35; 36-37). These supplement agreements provided payment of $36,000 to the architect,
recited that the architect had performed services pursuant to its employment contract which had not been
approved by the governing bodies of the city and
county as required under paragraph 5 of the original
contract and then provided as follows:
" 1 . The parties agree that the aforesaid agreement, together with all the terms and provisions
thereof is in full force and effect and shall remain in full force and effect until and unless
terminated pursuant to the terms thereof.
"2. The parties agree that the Architect has
performed services under the terms of the aforesaid agreement of a value to the owner of
$18,000 and that this amount would be due and

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

owing by the Owner to the Architect if the work
done by the Architect had in fact been approved
by the Owner.
"3. The Owner hereby agrees to pay the
Architect the sum of $18,000 and does in this instance, only, waive the provision of prior approval before making such payment.
"4. The Architect, in consideration of the payment herein stipulated, acknowledges that under
the terms of the aforesaid agreement he is not
entitled to be paid for any work done until the
same is approved by the Owner, acknowledges
that the waiver embodied herein does not in any
way affect any subsequent payment or payments
which may become due under the terms of the
aforesaid agreement; and further acknowledges
that the amount of $18,000 herein stipulated
constitutes full payment for all services rendered
by the Architect as of the date of this addendum
and that the Architect will not be entitled to
any further or additional payments from the
Owner until such time as other stages of the
Architect's work have been completed and approved by the Salt Lake City Board of Commissioners, as provided in the aforesaid agreement. The $18,000 paid pursuant hereto shall
be deemed to be part of the total fee due the
Architect under said agreement"
(Emphasis
added)
Thus, rather than termnate its contract with the
Architect when the Preliminary Plans and Drawings
were not accepted, the City and County paid $18,000
each, for a total payment of $36,000. This payment
was made for unapproved services performed by the
Architect to November 10, 1960. The parties, by said
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Supplemental Agreements, elected and agreed to proceed under the original contract with a new design concept and agreed that the $36,000 paid to and received
by the Arcbtect under the Supplemental Agreements
was for benefits to the City and County and would
apply against its total fee on the project. (R. 34-35,
36-37).
4. The redesigned project was ultimately approved, bids were obtained, and the contract for construction was let. Work under said construction contract was commenced on June 19, 1963 and construction of the project was completed on or about March
21, 1968. (See Item No. 4 of the Detailed Statement
attached as Exhibit V I to the Amended Complaint, It.
64-68).
5. The Architect's contracts with the City and
County dated March 1, 1960 and May 20, 1960, respectively, fixed no time within which the services thereunder were to be completed by the Architect; rather,
they clearly contemplated an extended period of construction by requiring additional payment for on-site
inspection if such expense exceeded $15,000.00. Paragraph 7 of the Architect's contract with the City and
County specifically provided as follows:
"7. G E N E R A L
ADMINISTRATION.
The Architect shall furnish at his expense a
qualified on-site inspector, acceptable to both
Owner and Architect, during the entire time the
construction work is in progress, whose duties
shall consist of checking all shop drawings, for
approval of the City Engineer, to determine the
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quality and acceptance of the material and/or
equipment proposed to be used in the facilities
being constructed; to supervise and inspect all
phases of the work being done.
. /'The costs, to be paid by the Architect for
the above services to be rendered, shall not exceed $15,000.00. In the event these services exceed this amount, it is hereby agreed by all concerned that the Owner shall assume all costs in
excess thereof." (Emphasis added) (R. 30).
6. The City and County did pay to the plaintiffappellant Architect the amount of $26,825.20 for the
additional on-site inspection in accordance with the foregoing paragraph 7. (See defendant-respondent Salt
Lae City Corporation's Request for Admission of Fact
No. 7 which is admitted by the plaintiff-appellant, R.
222,228).
7. The plaintiff-appellant received the sum of
$609,385.59 for its Architect's fees on the Metropolitan
Hall of Justice, which sum does not include the amount
of $26,825.20 for additional on-site inspection. (See
defendant-respondent Salt Lake City Corporation's
Request for Admission of Fact No. 9, admitted by
plaintiff, R. 222, 229).
8. The plaintiff-appellant allegedly filed its claim
for additional compensation dated January 22, 1969,
with the defendant-respondents on or about January
28th or 29th of 1969. (See paragraph 4 of the Amended
Complaint and Exhibits V and V I attached thereto,
R. 24, 47-70). Under the Detailed Statement, the
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architect-appellant alleges that the City and County
respondents are indebted to it in the total amount of
$130,079.45 for eight separate items of alleged extra
services. Its claim is based on paragraph 4 of its original Agreement with the City and County, which reads
as follows:
"4. E X T R A S E R V I C E S A N D S P E C I A L
C A S E S . If the Architect is caused extra drafting or other expenses due to changes ordered by
the Owner, or due to the delinquency or insolvency of the Owner or the Contractor, or as a result of damage by fire, he shall be equitably paid
for such extra expense and the service involved.
"Work let on any cost-plus basis shall be subject to a special charge in accord with the special
service required.
"If any work designed or specified by the
Architect is abandoned or suspended, in whole
or in part, the Architect is to be paid for the
service rendered on account of it."
These separate claims of plaintiff-appellant are as follows :
A. Item No. 1: A claim of $6,750.00 for the alleged attendance of two architect employees at
approximately 75 meetings of the Citizens Advisory Committee and its Executive Committee.
The plaintiff-appellant was unable to provide to
the lower court information as to the dates, locations and names of persons in attendance at said
alleged meetings. Rather, plaintiff-appellant
simply indicates that such meetings occurred as
a result of the change in the basic design con-
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cept from a "high rise" building on or about
November 10, 1960, when the supplemental
agreement with Salt Lake City was executed.
(See defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's
Interrogatory No. 2 and plaintiff's answer
thereto, R, 213 ,214, 238-240). However, by the
plaintiff-appellant's own statement it was "The
Citizen's Advisory Committee who directed the
architect to abandon the preliminary drawings,
the outline specifications and the cost estimates
that had been proposed for a "High Rise Building" and that such drawings, specifications and
cost estimates were proposed during the period
from January 1, 1960 to October 6, 1960. See
Item No. 2 of the Detailed Statement attached
as Exhibit V I of the Amended Complaint. (R.
60-63). Thus, October 6, 1960 constituted the
finale for the "High Rise" concept and the intervention of the Citizen's Advisory Committee in
the architect's redesign program. The Citizen's
Advisory Committee asked the architect to reanalyze the Michael Saphier space analysis dated
August 24, 1960, which resulted in a 5-page report, submitted about October 6, 1960, and revised October 11, 1960, following which the decision to redesign the building was made. (See
plaintiff-appellant's answer to Salt Lake City
Corporation's Interrogatory No. 5 (a).(R. 216,
241). The plaintiff-appellant architect was fully
paid for these services under the November 10,
1960 Supplemental Agreement. (R. 34-35, 3637).
B. Item No. 2: A claim in the amount of $20,981.30 for alleged indirect and direct expenses
in connection with the preparation of preliminary drawings, outline specifications and cost estimates for a "High Rise Building" which were
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never approved by the city and county. The
claim specifically states that these services were
performed " (d)uring the period January 1, 1960
to October 6, 1960 . . ." (See Item No. 2 on
pages 2-4 of the Detailed Statement attached as
Exhibit V I to the Amended Complaint, R. 6063). Such services were expressly covered by the
Supplemental Agreements between the architect
and the City and County dated November 10,
1960 and December 30, 1960. Under these agreements the architect accepted $36,000.00 in "full
payment for all services rendered by the architect as of the date of this addendum . . . " (See
Exhibits I I and IV attached to the Amended
Complaint, R. 34, 35, 45, 46).
C. Item No. 3 is not a subject of this appeal.
D . Item No. 4 is the major claim of the architect and totals the sum of $95,893.15 for alleged
delay in the completion of the project by constructing the building complex in two phases to
permit utilization of the temporary police building on the site, until the new police building was
constructed. The architect alleges that there was
an increase of construction time from 739 calendar days to 1,736 calendar days by reason of
the foregoing . Said construction period allegedly lasted from June 19, 1963 to March 21, 1968.
(See Item No. 4 of the Detailed Statement attached as Exhibit V I to the Amended Complaint, R. 64-68).
However, the architect's contracts with the City
and County fixed no time within which its services thereunder were to be completed, but specifically provided for payment by the City and
County of on-site inspection costs in excess of
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$15,000.00. (See paragraph 7 of Exhibit I attached to the Amended Complaint, R. 30-31).
The City and County paid the architect $26,825.20 for additional on-site inspection in accordance with said agreement. (See Salt Lake City
Corporation's Request for Admission of Fact
No. 7 which is admitted by plaintiff-appellant,
R. 222; 228). Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellant received 75% of its basic fees prior to the
time construction even commenced on the pro*
ject. (See paragraph 5 of Exhibit I attached to
the Amended Complaint, R. 29, 30, and Salt
Lake City Corporation's Request for Admission
of Fact No. 34, admitted bv plaintiff-appellant,
R. 226;332).
E . Item No. 5 is not a subject of this appeal.
F . Item No. 6: A claim of $1,250.00 for alleged
time expended by Harold K. Beecher in "assembling documents and information instructing
City Attorney, writing letters, giving deposition,
attending District and Supreme Court hearings,
etc." in connection with the taxpayer's suit
against Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County
for awarding the jail equipment contract to the
second low bidder.
That case, Clayton v. Salt Lake City and Salt
Lake County, 15 U.2d 57, 387 P.2d 93, was
decided December 2, 1963, and affirmed the
award of a contract to the second low bidder,
Southern Steel Company, whose price was over
the low bidder by a sum of $55,321.00. (See decision of this court and Salt Lake City Corporation's Request for Admission of Facts No. 17
and 18, admitted by the plaintiff-appellant, R.
224; 231). The architect's fee on the said jail
equipment contract was ten percent (10%) of
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the construction cost thereof. (See paragraphs
B and 3 of Exhibit I attached to the Amended
Complaint, R. 27, 29, and Salt Lake City Corporation's Request for Admission of Fact No.
19, admitted by the plaintiff-appellant, R. 224;
231). Therefore, the successful defense of that
case resulted in the architect receiving $5,532.10
more than it would have received had said suit
been successful in requiring the letting of the
jail equipment contract to the low bidder.
Assistant Salt Lake City Attorney Jack L.
Crellin handled the city's defense in the Clayton
case from its inception to its conclusion and spent
only one afternoon with Mr. Beecher at his home
with respect to preparation of an affidavit to be
filed in support of the city's motion for summary judgment in said case. (See Salt Lake
City Corporation's Request for Admissions of
Facts Nos. 22 and 24, admitted by plaintiff-appellant, R. 231). Neither Mr. Crellin nor the
Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City ever
requested the plaintiff-appellant or Harold K.
Beecher to attend the hearing on the motion for
summary judgment before the District Court or
an argument on appeal before the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah in said suit. (See
Salt Lake City Corporation's Request for Admission of Facts No. 25, admitted by plaintiffappellant, R. 225; 231). The city received no
benefit from his attendance, which was done
solely out of his own interest and curiousity.
G. Item No. 7: A claim in the amount of
$3,000.00 for alleged preparation of space analysis surveys required by the Citizen's Advisory
Committee when it decided the Michael Saphier
space analysis dated August 24, 1960, was in-
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correct. T h e final 16 page analysis survey was
prepared and submitted by the architect to the
City and County on or about December 1, 1960,
with subsequent revisions on or about December 15, 1960, and J a n u a r y 3, 1961. They were
entirely completed prior to F e b r u a r y 1, 1961.
(See Salt L a k e City Corporation's Request
for Admissions of F a c t s Nos. 27 and 28, admitted by plaintiff-appellant, R. 225; 231, and
plaintiff-appellant's answer to Salt L a k e City
Corporation's Interrogatory N o . 5 ( a ) , R. 216,
217; R. 241, 242.) The architect had earlier submitted a 27 page space analysis report dated M a y
16, 1960, and a 5 page space analysis report
about October 6, 1960, which was revised about
October 11, 1960, after which the architect was
directed to redesign the building. (See plaintiffappellant's answer to Salt L a k e City Corporation's Interrogatory N o . 5 ( a ) , R. 216, 217; 241,
242.)
H . I t e m N o . 8: A claim of $1,000.00 for alleged preparation of square foot drawings and
computations to determine the amount of space
to be occupied by the city, the county and jointly
in the Metropolitan H a l l of Justice. The first
of such drawings and computations was made
in September or October of 1960, with respect
to the feigh rise building, the second submittal
was early in the design stage of the present
building, the third was in response to a request
prior to December 22, 1964, and the last was submitted about F e b r u a r y 14, 1966 with the final
revision thereof submitted about October 6, 1966.
(See plaintiff-appellant's answer to Salt L a k e
City Corporation's Interrogatory N o . 7 ( a ) , R.
217, 218; 242, 243). The plaintiff-appellant admits that all services included under I t e m N o . 8
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were performed prior to October 7, 1966. (See
Salt Lake City Corporation's Request for Admissions of Facts No. 33, admitted by plaintif fappellant, R. 226; 232).
9. In December, 1965, the plaintiff-appellant commenced an action in the District Court of Salt Lake
County against Salt Lake City Corporation, designated
as Civil No. 161546, in which the plaintiff sought recovery against the City for several claims allegedly
due for services rendered and money expended under
the terms of the same contract attached as Exhibit I
to the plaintiff-appellant's Amended Complaint in this
action. However, none of the claims included in Items
No. 1, No. 2, No. 6 and No. 7 herein were asserted in
that prior action. (See Salt Lake City Corporation's
Request for Admissions of Facts Nos. 29 and 30, admitted by plaintiff-appellant, R. 225; 231, 232.)
£tt€p*irt(\
10. Tflyppniting only inspection duties, the last work
on the project by plaintiff-appellant architect was
prior to October 11, 1966. (R. 217, 218, 242, 243). The
plaintiff-appellant architect filed no claim with the City
or County for the claims subject of this suit until subsequent to January 22,1969. (R. 47).
11. The claims of plaintiff-appellant were denied
in writing by City Attorney Jack L. Crellin, February
9, 1970, who stated that plaintiff-appellant owed the
city $249.84. (R. 92). On March 6, 1970, the plaintiffappellant filed a Second Petition, wherein he requested
of the City and petitioned the County Commission for
arbitration regarding his January 22, 1969 claim. (R.
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72). The County Attorney advised against such a procedure in that the claim was deemed denied under the
provisions of 63-30-14, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
and the letters of the City Attorney of February 9,
1970. (R. 73). Both the City and County refused
arbitration as requested in the second petition. (R. 76,
77).
12. The plaintiff-appellant failed to file suit until
April 2, 1971, approximately 2 years 3 months after
filing its claim. ( R . l ) . This suit was commenced more
than one year after the claim's denial by the City and
County. (Sections 10-7-77 and 63-30-1 et seq. Utah
Code Ann. 1953; R. 73; R. 76, 77; R. 180).
13. On June 13, 1972, plaintiff-appellant's
torney certified to the court:

at-

(a) "That he had interviewed all witnesses he
might call at the trial of the case;"
(b) "That all needed drawings and documents, etc., are ready to be offered in evidence;"
(c) ". . . all necessary discovery had been
completed;"
(d) "All necessary examination and deposition had been concluded." (R. 210)
14. The matter was set for trial January 12, t9T2.
(R. 211). Thereafter, on December 5, 1972, plaintiff
appellant requested a pretrial conference. (R. 235).
Said conference was approved and subsequently held
before Judge D. Frank Wilkins, February 22, 1973 and
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flflarch 5, 1973. (R. 237, 246, 247). At said hearing, a
motion for summary judgment to dismiss on pleadings
and judgment on pleading were received and upon
request leave was granted to submit memoranda of
law. Defendants submitted theirs on or about March 8,
1973. (R. 249, 251, 255). Plaintiff-appellant filed no
response for more than 10 months. The Lower Court
after studying the matter entered judgment in favor
of defendants Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County
January 22, 1947 on six of the eight claims, but reserved for trial the remaining issues and a counterclaim for trial. (R. 249, 250).
15. Plaintiff-appellant filed a "Petition for an
Intermediate Appeal" on or about J&ebruary 22, 1974.
This request was denied March 5, raw. (Utah Supreme
Court case Number 13605). At the same date of filing
said petition, plaintiff-appellant filed a "Notice of Appeal" with the Third District Court. (R. 278). Despite
the Petition for Intermediate Appeal's denial, plaintiffappellant filed an appeal brief with this court. Defendant-respondent Salt Lake City filed a Motion to
Dismiss said appeal, which the court took under advisement. Subsequently, the parties stipulated to a
dismissal of the matters reserved for trial and this brief
is submitted on the matters subject of Judge Wilkins
Pre-Trial Judgment decision.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
W H E N A CONTRACT FOR ARCHITECT U R A L SERVICES STATES NO
TIME
WITHIN WHICH THE ARCHITECTURAL
S E R V I C E S T H E R E U N D E R A R E TO B E
COMPLETED AND T H E F E E OF W H I C H IS
B A S E D ON A P E R C E N T A G E O F T H E CONS T R U C T I O N COST, N O C L A I M F O R A D D I T I O N A L COMPENSATION FOR CONSTRUCT I O N D E L A Y M A Y B E A L L O W E D TO T H E
ARCHITECT.
Item No. 4 of plaintiff-appellant's detailed statement, dated January 22, 1969 and attached as Exhibit
V I to plaintiff-appellant's amended complaint, constitutes a claim .against the defendants-respondents to
the amount £g $95,893.15. It was submitted to defendants-respondents as a demand for additional compensation above a fixed six percent architectural fee
agreement. Plaintiff-appellant alleged the claim is for
expenses caused by delay in the construction time required for the completion of the Metropolitan Hall of
Justice. I t is plaintiff-appellant's contentions that such
period of time was not contemplated by the parties
when they entered into the original contract for architectural services.
Importantly, however, it should be noted that the
contract for the construction of the complex was actually completed within the time prescribed in the con16
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struction contract. Further, the undisputed facts disclose that the plaintiff-appellant's contracts with the
City and County fix no time within/thk architectural
services thereunder were to be completed. Rather, his
compensation was to be a fixed fee of six percent of
the construction cost. (R-27). However, extra compensation was agreed to be paid if: (a) Changes were
made in approved drawings; (b) Expenses were incurred by "delinquency" or "insolvency" of the owner
or contractor; or (c) Expenses were incurred because
work designed or specified on the approved project was
abandoned or suspended. See paragraph 4 of the parties
agreement, Statement of Fact 7 supra at p. 6; R-29.
Since none of these agreed contingencies are even alleged to have precipitated this claim, the clear contract
provisions for a fixed six percent fee bars extra compensation under the explicit terms of the contract as a
matter of law.
Plaintiff-appellant architect, however, asserts parol
evidence should be admitted to show intent. In that
assertion the architect does not show how the written
agreement between the parties or its supplements are
vague or ambiguous as to need clarification. Rather,
he seeks parol evidence, to create a new term which was
not part of the written integration of the parties understandings, which agreements generously paid to the
architect over $609,000.00 as a six percent architectural
fee based on the construction cost.
This court has consistently denied the use of parol
evidence to modify such an integrated, complete state17
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ment of terms in a written contract. The court has
correctly observed:
"The rule is well settled, that where the parties
reduce to writing what appears to be a complete
and certain agreement, it will, in the absence of
fraud, be conclusively presumed that the writing
contained the whole of the agreement between
the parties and that is a complete memorial of
such agreement, and that parol evidence of the
contemporaneous conversation, representations,
or statements will not be received for the purpose
of varying or adding to the terms of the written
document." Rainford v. Rytting, 22 U.2d 252,
451 P.2d 769 (1969) (Emphasis added)
Further, in the case before the bar, the contract
itself is clear that the parties contemplated an extended
construction period and made provisions for extra pay
to the architect for such expenses. The agreement provided that the architect was to:
"Furnish at his expense a qualified on-site inspector, acceptable to the owner and architect,
during the entire time the construction work is in
progress, . . ." (Paragraph 7 of the party's contract attached as Exhibit V I to plaintiff-appellant's amended complaint, R. 30) (Emphasis
added)
Also, under the said contract, the architect was to pay
the cost of providing all inspections; however, such cost
was not to exceed the sum of $15,000.00. The agreement specifically provided that:
"In the event these services exceed this
amount, it is hereby agreed by all concerned that
the owner (Salt Lake City and County) shall
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assume all costs in excess thereof." (Paragraph
7 of the contract between the parties, R. 30).
Pursuant to the provisions of the contract, plaintiff
submitted a bill for and received the sum of $26,825.20
for additional on-site inspections. Not only did the
plaintiff-appellant architect receive the above stated
benefits, but on November 10, 1960, entered into a
supplemental agreement with the defendants-respondents whereunder he agreed to receive a total of $36,000.00 for work done but not approved, knowing that
a new type of design was desired. (R. 34) This
amended agreement incorporated by reference the
earlier agreement and made no amendment with regard
to a specified time for construction completion or payment for delays which would follow starting over on
the project.
Thus, it is absolutely clear that under the terms of
the agreement the parties intentionally did not fix the
time within which the architect's services were to be
completed; rather, they expressly recognized that the
construction period could extend beyond the time fixed
by the on-site inspection to be provided by the architect.
Under these circumstances, the law is clear that the
plaintiff is not entitled to additional compensation as
alleged and parol evidence is not admissible to modify
the agreement.
Supportive of this conclusion is the case law dealing specifically with this issue. Thus in the case of
Osterling v. First National Bank, an architect sued to
recover additional compensation for delay in the con-
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struction of a bank building, claiming that changes were
made in the details of the structure which almost doubled the original contract cost and delayed completion
of the project for some eight months. The court specifically held that the architect was not entitled to extra
compensation because of the delay in the construction
of the building, where the contract fixed no time within
which his services were to be completed. The court
specifically stated:
"The claim for compensation for delay is also
without merit. The contract under which he
claims fixes no time within which his services
were to be completed. The building actually
cost almost double the amount originally contemplated and his commissions were correspondingly
increased. This was adequate compensation for
the delay incident to the construction of the enlarged building, but this is not the reason for
our refusal to allow his claim. H e was not entitled to make it under the contract which he
himself prepared." Osterling v. First National
Bank, 105 A. 633 (Pa. 1918); 5 Am.Jur.2d,
"Architects." § 14 at p. 676.
The case before the bar is virtually identical
facts m the Osterling case. Here the total cost of the
Metropolitan Hall of Justice was increased considerably
from that envisioned at the time the contract was executed in March 1960. Extra work orders alone increased the plaintiff-appellant architect's fees in excess
of $42,000.00. (See defendant Salt Lake City Corporation's Request for Admissions of Facts Nos. 3 and
5, admitted by plaintiff ; R . 221, 228).
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An additional case illustrative and supportive of
this principle that an architect may not receive an additional fee on an architectural percentage contract when
that contract does not fix a time for completion, is
McDonald Brothers v. Whitney County Court, 8 Ky.
L. Rep. 874 (1887) as discussed in Annotation, 20
A.L.R. 1356, 1360-1361. As in the case before the bar,
the architect's contract contained no limitation or conditions as to the time for the construction of the building. However, the architect was obligated to superintend the construction of the project for a specified
fee. Also, the construction contract contained a provision that if any charges were made by the architect for supervision of the construction work which
extended longer than the specified time agreed upon
for the completion of the building of the project, such
charges would be deducted from the amount of the construction contract price for the benefit of the architect.
Thereafter, the original contractor abandoned the project and it was let to a second building contractor, who
refused to agree to the provisions for deductions for
additional architect's charges. The architect then
sought to recover for the delay involved in the completion of the work.
The court held that inasmuch as the architect's
contract was for a definite sum without limit or condition as to time, he could not recover on the theory that
the provisions of the building contract modified his
own contract. Again the rule is consistent and unequivocal. An architect may not recover for the delay in the
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construction time unless his contract so provides by a
specific limitation as to the time within which his services are to be performed.
In the instant case, the facts are clear and undisputed that the plaintiff-appellant agreed to provide architectural services, including superintending
the construction of the project, for six percent of the
cosntruction fees; it is without dispute that this fee of
over $609,000.00 was fully paid. There was no time in
the contract set for completion; rather, this contingency
was covered by a provision indemnifying the architect
for any out-of-pocket inspection expenses he incurred
should those expenses exceed the expense contemplated
in the contract. The plaintiff-appellant indeed received
full additional compensation for these services of approximately $27,000.00, almost double the $15,000.00
base expense figure in the fpwripH agreement.
Further, it is without dispute that the plaintiffappellant architect received an additional sum exceeding $42,000.00 by virtue of extra work orders in the
agreement. In addition, the parties had knowledge
that the first preliminary drawings were not accepted
and signed a supplemental agreement knowing delay
was evident, without amending the fee arrangements
and without setting a time limit for completion.
Therefore, it is respectfully submitted that the
lower court properly held that Item No. 4 claimed by
the architect failed to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted and that the defendants-respondents
were entitled to a judgment of no cause of action as a
matter of law on this issue.
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POINT I I
T H E NOVEMBER 10,1960 S U P P L E M E N T AL AGREEMENT, AS A MATTER OF LAW,
IS A F U L L ACCORD AND SATISFACTION
SATISFYING ALL CLAIMS FOR COMPENSATION
FOR
SERVICES
RENDERED
PRIOR TO T H A T DATE. SAID S U P P L E MENTAL CONTRACT WAS E N T E R E D INTO
BY T H E P A R T I E S , SUPPORTED BY VALUABLE CONSIDERATION AND IS A COMP L E T E , UNAMBIGUOUS E X P R E S S I O N OF
T H E P A R T I E S UNDERSTANDING;
AS
SUCH I T IS A VALID BINDING AGREEMENT TO BE ENFORCED.
Items No. 1 and No. 2 of plaintiff-appellant architect's claim concern a request for payment for attending some 75 meetings alleged to have been attended
by it and for unapproved architectural services rendered prior to November 10, 1960, totalling some $27,731.30. The assertion is utterly perplexing in view of
a clear and unambiguous agreement of November 10,
1960 whereunder plaintiff-appellant architect agreed
to and in fact accepted $36,000.00 as payment for all
services rendered prior to that date. I t is also perplexing in view of the fact that the city and county were
not appraised of its claim or its intention to make such
a claim for a period of in excess of eight years from
the date of this supplemental agreement. (R-24)
The claim is the furthermore startling in that after
receiving the $36,000.00 cash benefit, plaintiff-appel23
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lant architect in this litigation now challenges the validity of the supplemental contract by alleging: (a) I t
is void for lack of consideration; (b) The agreement
does not mean what it clearly states and that the architect should be able, by parol evidence, to have a trial
on its intent; and (c) I t is invalid because it was obtained by economic coercion. See page 9-13 of plaintiffappellant's Brief. These matters will be discussed
separately.
A.

CONSIDERATION

The facts are undisputed that on the 1st day of
March, 1960 and on the 20th day of May, 1960, the
parties entered into substantially identical agreements
whereunder the city and county agreed to pay the
architect a fee of six percent of the construction cost
of a project for the construction of the Metropolitan
Hall of Justice. Said agreement provided that payment to the architect would be made on a schedule as
follows:
"Upon completion of the schematic studies
and proper approval of the same, a sum equal
to ten percent of the Basic Rate, computed upon
a reasonable estimated cost."
"Upon completion of the preliminary studies
and proper approval of the same, a sum equal
to fifteen percent of the Basic Rate, computed
upon a reasonable estimated cost." (R. 29) (Emphasis added)
Significantly, none of this work performed by the
architect prior to November 10, 1970 was satisfactory
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to the defendants-respondents and was never approved.
Rather, after seeing the preliminary work, it was determined that the "high rise" concept was not desired
and a new design approach should be undertaken.
Therefore, the parties entered into a supplemental
agreement whereunder compensation would be made to
the architect for the unapproved work and expenses he
had incurred therein, to keep the prior contract in full
force and effect, and waive a provision in the earlier
agreement regarding prior approval. The said supplemental agreement dated with Salt Lake City, November 10, 1980 and December 30, 1960 with Salt Lake
County specifically states as follows:
"4. The architect, in consideration of the payment herein stipulated, acknowledges that under
the terms of the aforesaid agreement he is not
entitled to be paid for any work done until the
same is approved by the owner; and acknowledges that the waiver embodied herein does not
in any way affect any subsequent payment ofL
payments which may become due under the terms
of the aforesaid agreement; and further acknowledges that the amount of $18,000.00 ($18,000.00 for each of the city and county governments, for a total of $36,000.00) herein stipulated constitutes full payment for all services
rendered by architect as of the date of this addendum and that architect will not be entitled to
any further or additional payments from the
owner until such time as other stages of the work
have been completed and approved by the Salt
Lake City Board of Commissioners, as provided
in the aforesaid agreement. The $18,000.00 paid
pursuant hereto shall be deemed to be a part
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of the total fee due the architect under said
agreement." (R-35, R-46) (Emphasis added).
Thus, the parties clearly and unequivocally acknowledged in writing in the original contract that the
architect was entitled to no compensation for unapproved work. Under the supplemental agreement the
architect received $36,000.00 for unapproved work, at
variance to the legal obligation of the defendants-respondents under the original contract. Also, the architect received benefit of accelerated payments from those
scheduled in the original contract, in addition to an
affirmation of a contract that could have been cancelled without compensation to the architect if no acceptable plans had been developed by it. See Contract,
R. 27-33.
Certainly, any one of those benefits given to the
plaintiff-appellant architect and the concession by the
city and county constitutes sufficient consideration for
the agreement. That fact is true notwithstanding the
fact that the Supplemental Agreement was really a
bilateral contract; that is, a modification by mutual
agreement of the original understanding of the parties.
Clearly, the contract is valid and supported by adequate
consideration.
If further discussion is necessary, under the doctrine of accord and satisfaction, there was consideration
as a matter of law. The Utah Supreme Court has correctly observed:
"An accord is an agreement between parties,
one to give or perform, the other to receive or
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accept, such agreed payment or performance in
satisfaction of a claim. The 'satisfaction' is the
consummation of such agreement. Settlement of
an unliquidated or disputed claim where the
parties are a part in good faith presents such consideration." Browing v. Equitable Life Assurance, Soc, 94 U .532, 72 P.2d 1060,1068 (1937).
If the plaintiff-appellant architect did in fact make
a claim for work done prior to November 10, 1960, the
City and County could refuse to pay under the terms
of the first agreement because no approval had been
given. The claim was therefore unliquidated and a disputed claim. Settlement of such a claim was an accord
and satisfaction supported by adequate consideration as
a matter of law.
Also, it is clear that by acquiescence the plaintiffappellant architect is estopped to deny the validity of
the Supplemental Agreement by virtue of the benefits
it has received and the time that has elapsed without
complaint. As previously stated, the plaintiff-appellant
received $36,000.00 on or about November 10, 1960. In
addition, it received the benefit of proceeding with the
agreement as modified by the Supplemental Agreement for a period of time between November 10, 1960
and his claim for payment dated January 22, 1969.
This is a period in excess of eight years. The law of
estoppel and waiver is clear that he cannot at that late
date challenge the agreement. The rule is summarized
as follows:
"The rule is that where a party with full
knowledge, of his rights and of all the material
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facts, remains inactive for a considerable time or
abstains from impeaching a contract or transaction, or freely does what amounts to a recognition thereof as existing, or acts in a manner
inconsistent with its repudiation and so as to
affect or interfere with the relation and situation
of the parties, so that the other party is induced
to suppose that it is recognized, this amounts to
acquiescence and the transaction, although originally impeachable, becomes unimpeachable." 28
Am. Jur. 2d "Estoppel & Waiver" p. 674, paragraph 57 and cases therein cited.
I t is respectfully submitted that the Supplemental
Agreement of November 10, 1960 is supported by
adequate consideration, is valid and that even accepting
arguendo that it lacked consideration, the architect is
estopped to challenge its validity.
B.

PAROL EVIDENCE

A discussion of this issue has been made supra at
p. 18.
C.

ECONOMIC COERCION

The plaintiff-appellant nakedly alleges in its
Complaint and in answers to Requests for Admissions
that the Supplemental Agreement of November 10,
1960 was void because it was obtained by economic coercion. See R-29 and p. 11 of plaintiff-appellant's
brief. Again, the defendants Salt Lake City and Salt
Lake County were surprised by this announcement in
view of the more than eight year lapse of time since
the architect executed the Supplemental Agreement
28

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and the lapse of over a year between the time the project had been fully constructed and the first time the
issue is raised.
Further, it is interesting that at the pre-trial conference requested by the plaintiff-appellant March 5,
1973, the appellant architect was unable to establish
any significant facts, after two years of trial preparation, to support this charge. Even after filing a Motion
for Reconsideration, the architect made no proffer of
proof. See R. 260-273.
Further, the law regarding a claim of this type is
clear that a contract alleged to have been obtained by
duress (coercion) or undue influence is not void; rather
it is only voidable at the option of the person coerced.
This court has succinctly observed:
"Generally, the consequence of duress are voidable only, not void." State v. Barlow, 107 U. 292,
153 P.2d 647, 654 (1944) (Emphasis added)
Further, one cannot accept the benefits of a contract and later attempt to void it on the grounds of
coercion. This court has correctly observed:
"As a rule, in a transaction requiring mutual
consent, if the consent is obtained by coercion, the
victim may either affirm or void the transaction,
but he may not claim the benefits and escape the
obligations" State v. Barlow, id. at p. 654.
(Emphasis added)
In addition, the law is clear that the coercion necessary to enable one to void a contract must constitute
such an overreaching as to be wrongful, unlawful or

29

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

unconscionable to the court. Federal courts have correctly observed:
"A finding of duress at least must reflect a
conviction that one party to a transaction was so
improperly imposed upon by the other that a
court should intervene." Hellenic Lines, Inc. v.
Dreyfus Corp., 372 F2d 753 (Emphasis added).
See also, 17 C.J.S., "Contracts" paragraph 178
at p. 967.
Using these legal principles, the courts have consistently
held that mere need or difficult financial circumstances
are not sufficient. The Michigan Court noted:
"The fact that a contractor was 'hard-up' when
he signed the release of claims was not in itself
sufficient to constitute duress. Norton v. Michigan Highway Dept. 24 N.W.2d 132.
Our sister state Idaho also noted and observed:
"Business compulsion is not established merely
by proof that consent is secured by pressure of
financial circumstances, or that one party insisted upon a legal right and the other party
yielded to such insistance. Neither will a mere
threat to withhold from a party a legal right
which he has adequate legal remedy to enforce,
SmwMSfb auress. Generally the demand must
be wrongful or unlawful, and the other party
must have no other means of immediate relief
from the actual or threatened duress than by
compliance with the demand." Inland Refineries
v. Jones, 206 P.2d 519, 522 (Idaho 1949).
Plaintiff's complaint fails to make allegations
even to state a claim in these regards; rather, it affirms
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that the supplemental contract "modified" the original
without even challenging its validity. See plaintiff-appellant's amended complaint, It. 23-26. Also, the undisputed facts show that there was no voidance by
plaintiff-appellant of the Supplemental Contract:
rather, he operated under it from November 10, 1#§*F
until he had received all of the contract benefits.
It is respectfully submitted that as a matter of
law the lower court was correct in its decision. The
supplemental agreement was supported by adequate
consideration, the plaintiff received the benefits of the
agreement and had not at any time voided the Supplemental Agreement. Thus, the architect was and is
estopped to deny its validity, having elected to affirm
and work under it. The lower court was justified in
affirming the agreement as a full accord and satisfaction and ruling as a matter of law that it was not obtained under facts and circumstances which would
render it void. Therefore, the Items No. 1 and No. 2
of plaintiff-appellant architect's claim as a matter of
law are not subject of litigation and were properly
dismissed by the lower court.
If further discussion of this point is necessary, it
is to be noted that coercion is a specie of fraud and
the 3 year statute of limitation for fraud had long run
before suit was filed. Price v. The Estate of Havereligh, 428 S.W.2d 422; Leeper v. Beltrami, 347 P.2d 12
(Calif. 1959); 77 ALR2d 803; Section 78-12-26(3)
Utah Code Ann., 1953. Also, fraud must be specifically plead, but the architect did not even allege this
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claim in its amended complaint. (R. 23-26).
assertion must fall as a matter of law.

The

POINT III
I T E M NO. 6 C L A I M E D B Y T H E P L A I N TIFF-APPELLANT ARCHITECT
WHICH
T H E UNDISPUTED FACTS SHOW ARE
NOT P A R T OF A CLAIM UPON W H I C H
R E L I E F CAN B E G R A N T E D .
The undisputed facts show that Item No. 6 is a
claim for $1,250.00 for non-architectural time allegedly
expended by Harold K. Beecher in assembling documents for the civil litigation in the case of Clayton v.
Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County, 15 U.2d 5,
387 P.2d 93. These facts further show that the total
time expended by Mr. Beecher, at the request of either
of the parties-defendant, was an afternoon in preparation of an affidavit for summary judgment for the
District Court. Further, the litigation was a case in
which the plaintiff-appellant architect had an interest
equal with the city in that by successful defense, he
received an additional fee of $5,532.10 based on his
10% percentage fee of the contract cost.
The time claimed by plaintiff-appellant for Mr.
Beecher's attendance at various court hearings was
purely voluntary as he was neither requested to attend
nor needed to be in attendance. See Statement of Fact
No. 8F, supra at p. 10. Time spent at depositions
by Mr. Beecher was required by the plaintiff in that
32
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case not the city or the county. Mr. Beecher was subpoenaed by said plaintiff and received his statutory
fee. (R. 225; 231). Certainly, the city and county are
not additionally responsible to pay for his time in
attendance.
Importantly, the contracts subject of the within litigation have no provisions which provide for the compensation of the architect for non-architectural services,
such as court appearances. Statement of Facts, Nos.
2 and 5, supra at pages 3 and 5. The plaintiff's complaint did not allege that he is entitled to compensation
by virtue of quantum meruit or some other implicit
agreement whereunder the city or the county agreed to
pay for Mr. Beecher providing the affidavit. Plaintiffappellant had an equal interest in that suit with the Defendants and no agreement by the city or county was
made to pay the architect for attending court hearings
to satisfy his own tmmmm&. I
There was no benefit received by the defendantsrespondents by the attendance at the court hearings by
Mr. Beecher. Certainly, the plaintiff-appellant architect having entered pre-trial conference had a duty to
render to the court at least a proffer of proof to support its claim on these issues. I t failed to meet this
burden and the court properly dismissed these claims.
P O I N T IV
ALL CLAIMS OF T H E P L A I N T I F F - A P P E L L A N T A R C H I T E C T A B E N O T RECOVE R A B L E F O R F A I L U R E TO F I L E A T I M E -
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L Y CLAIM AS R E Q U I R E D BY T H E PROV I S I O N S O F 10-7-77 A N D S E C T I O N 63-30-1 E T
SEQ., U T A H CODE A N N . 1953. F U R T H E R ,
T H E E N T I R E CLAIM OF T H E P L A I N T I F F A P P E L L A N T A R C H I T E C T IS BARRED BY
I T S F A I L U R E TO F I L E S U I T W I T H I N
ONE YEAR A F T E R T H E D E N I A L OF ITS
CLAIM AS P R O V I D E D BY U T A H LAW.
The undisputed facts show that the claims of the
plaintiff-appellant are based on work done and completed on the dates as hereinafter stated; to-wit:

DATE W O R K
COMPLETED AND/OR
CLAIM ACCRUED

CLAIM SUBJECT
Item No. 1—
Alleged attendance at sundry
meetings of the Citizens Advisory
Committee.
Item No. 2—
Alleged direct and indirect
expenses in connection with
preliminary drawings, outline
specification and cost estimates
for "high rise" building.

May 11, 1960
Findings of Facts No. 8A
Supra at p. 7.
October 6, 1960
Statement of Facts No. 8A
Supra at p. 7.

Item No. 3—
Not subject of this appeal.
Item No. 4—
Construction lasted from
Claim for expenses caused by
delay in construction completion. June 19, 1963 through
March 21, 1968.
Statement of Facts No. 8D
Supra at p. 9.
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tern No. 5—
Tot subject of this appeal.
tern No. 6—
?ime in preparation and
December 2,1963,
ssistance in Clayton v. Salt
Statement of Facts No. 8F
.take City and Salt Lake County. Supra at p. 10.
tern No. 7—
Vlleged preparation of space
tnalysis survey.

February 1,1961,
Statement of Facts No. 8G
Supra at p. 11.

[tern No. 8—
Alleged preparation of square
[oot drawings and computations
for space study.

October 6,
Statement of Facts No. 8 H
Supra at p. 12.

Prior to the passage of the Governmental Immunity Act in 1965, Utah law clearly provided that
every claim against a city or town had to be presented
within one year after the last item of such account or
claim accrued. The then applicable law stated:
"Every claim, other than the claims above
mentioned (those dealing with defective, unsafe
or dangerous streets or bridges), against any
city or town must be presented, properly itemized or described and verified as to correctness
by the claimant or his agent, to the governing
body within one year after the last item of such
account or claim accrued, . . ." 10-7-77, Utah
Code Ann. 1953 (Emphasis added); cf. 10-7-77,
as amended in 1973.
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The law further clearly provided:
"It shall be a sufficient bar and answer to
any action or proceeding against a city or town
in any court for the collection of any claim mentioned in Section 10-7-77, that such claim had
not been presented to the governing body of
such city or town in the manner and within the
time specified in Section 10-7-77; . . ." 10-7-78,
Utah Code Ann. 1953.
I t is undisputed that no claim was filed with the city
with regard to any of the matters subject of the within litigation prior to January 28, 1969. See Statement of Fact No. 8, supra at p. 6. With the exception of Item No. 4 and No. 8, it is apparent from the
undisputed facts that no claim was filed within that one
year period; therefore, the other claims individually are
barred. Claims No. 4 and No. 8 are discussed hereafter,
but the lower court's decision on the others should be
affirmed by this court for this reason alone.
In addition and supportive of a conclusion that
all claims are barred, is the fact that in 1965 the Utah
Legislature passed the Governmental Immunity Act,
which required that a claim be filed with the political
subdivision of the state within ninety days after the
"cause of action" arose. The law states:
"A claim against a political subdivision shall
be forever barred unless notice thereof is filed
within ninety days after the cause of action
arises; provided, however, that any claim filed
against a city or incorporated town under Section 63-30-8 (concerning defective, unsafe or
dangerous conditions of highways, bridges or
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structures) shall be governed by the provisions
of Section 10-7-77, Utah Code Annotated 1953,*'
63-30-13 Utah Code Ann. 1953.* (Emphasis
added)
Therefore, any claim which matured to be a cause of
action after 1965 had to be filed as a claim with the
city or county within ninety days. Clearly, on the undisputed facts, any claim allegedly maturing to be a
"cause of action" after 1965 was not timely filed in
that the latest date for filing would have been June
22, 1968. This fact is true because that date is 90 days
subsequent to the date of completion of the construction contract. See Item No. 4, supra at p. 5. The
plaintiff-appellant's claim was not filed until January
28,1969.
I n addition, the Governmental Immunity Act
provides that claims, once filed, shall be deemed denied
if the governmental body does not respond within
ninety days. The law clearly states:
"A claim shall be deemed to have been denied
if at the end of the ninety-day period the government entity or its insurance carrier has failed
to approve or deny the claim." 63-30-14, Utah
Code Ann. 1953.
Thereafter, the claimant must file an action within one
year or the action is barred. The law on this point
states:
"Said action must be commenced within one
year after denial or the denial period as specified herein." 63-30-13, Utah Code Ann. 1953.
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The undisputed facts show that the first claim
made by the plaintiff-appellant architect was dated
January 22, 1969 and was not submitted to the City or
County Commissions prior to January 28, 1969. See
E m r a a g ! of Fact No. 8, supra at p. 6. Therefore,
that claim would have been deemed denied under the
provisions of the Governmental Immunity Act as of
April 29, 1969; thereafter, the plairrftff would imve
been obligated to file a suit on or before April 28, H00.
However, the suit was not filed until April of 1971,
year#late.
Admittedly, there is some room for discussion regarding the date of denial in that a formal written
denial was entered under date of February 9, 1970.
See Statement of Fact No. 11, supra at p. 13. However, even using that date, the plaintiff-appellant
would have been obligated to file suit prior to February 10, 1971, which he did not do. Thus, regardless
if one uses the implied denial or the written denial, the
plaintiff failed to file timely litigation as required by
the Governmental Immunity Act. As such, in addition
to the fatal defect of failing to timely file a claim,
the claims are barred as a matter of law.
The plaintiff-appellant architect's only defense to
these clear statutory provisions appear to be: (a) Its
assertion that the Governmental Immunity Act provisions dealing with filing claims do not apply to contract actions (R-25); and (b) That the city and
county are estopped from asserting the claim in that
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suit was not filed within a year after the denial of the
claim. (R-26).
With reference to its first assertion, there is no
factual dispute that, excepting only claim Item No.
4, plaintiff-appellant architect failed to meet the applicable provisions of 10-7-77, Utah Code Ann. See discussion supra at p. 36. Thus, even if the architect's
argument is accepted arguendo, Section 10-7-77 remains. Therefore, the Governmental Immunity Act
found in Title 63 is not even needed to defeat those
claims.
However, the Governmental Immunity Act by its
own terms affirmatively states that it applies to contractual obligations; it provides:
"Immunity from suit for all governmental entities is waived as to any contractual obligation"
63-30-5, Utah Code Ann. 1953. (Emphasis
added)
Further, the Act defines "claim" as follows:
"The word 'claim' shall mean any claim
brought against a governmental entity or its employees as permitted by this act;" 63-30-2(5),
Utah Code Ann. 1953. (Emphasis added)
Thus, the word "claim" as used in Sections 63-30-13,
14 and 15, which impose time limitations for filing
claims and suit by definition applies to all matters
covered by the Governmental Immunity Act, including
contract obligations. If the plaintiff-appellant architect's contra position were correct and the legislature
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intended the Governmental Immunity Act only to apply to torts, it would have used the word "injury" instead of "claim" in those sections, because that word
is defined to be essentially tort actions. See 63-30-2
(6), Utah Code Ann. 1953; cf. 63-30-2(5), Utah Code
Ann. 1953. The naked assertion of the plaintiff-appellant, unsupported by any authority, is not well taken
and the lower court's decision should be affirmed.
The second assertion relating to estoppel, at the
date of the pre-trial conference constituted a naked
assertion that plaintiff-appellant was mislead by the
negotiating for arbitration and, thus, delayed in filing
timely suit. This position was never reduced to sworn
affidavit form. Contrarywise, Mr. Jack Crellin under
oath denied that he had engaged in discussions or negotiations concerning arbitration. His denial of February
9, 1970 was deemed by him to be final. (R-176). Salt
Lake County by written decision advised the county
that arbitration was not a legal requirement and referred to Mr. Crellin's opinion for a denial. (R-73-75).
Both city and county commissions responded to the
plaintiff-appellant's second petition requesting this arbitration with a denial. (R-76, 77). Thus, the matters
of record at the pre-trial hearing affirmatively indicate that there were no facts and circumstances to
justify an estoppel theory.
Further, it is important to note that under Rule 16
concerning pre-trial conference requested by the plaintiff-appellant, he is under an obligation to at least
make a proffer of proof sufficient to indicate a prima
40
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facie case for trial. This obligation plaintiff-appellant
failed to meet. Therefore, it is respectfully submitted
that the lower court was justified in its dismissal.
However, even accepting arguendo the architect's
position, it has stated no reason or justification why the
claim dated January 22, 1969 was not timely filed. H e
has not alleged nor asserted that his delay was by any
act on the part of the defendants-respondents to raise
an estoppel theory. Rather, the estoppel question goes
solely to the filing of suit date in April 1971. Therefore, in any event, the architect's claims must fail for
failure to file a timely claim.
In addition, if no other theory is appropriate, certainly latches should bar these individual claims. Plaintiff-appellant architect received in excess of $630,000.00
on this project for services rendered and did so without once advising defendant-respondent that he was
seeking additional compensation. I t received all of the
benefits and gave no notice for over eight years. The
plaintiff-appellant architect failed to advise the defendants concerning its claims until the latter part of January 1969, even though most of these were completed
well before October 6,1966.
I t is respectfully submitted that the lower court's
decision dismissing all counts at the preliminary hearing is correct and proper. This court should likewise
affirm the lower court's decision for the above stated
reasons.
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SUMMARY
The suit by the plaintiff-appellant architect seeks
an additional $130,000.00 on eight separate claims for
work allegedly done relating to the construction of
the Metropolitan Hall of Justice, in addition to the over
$630,000.00 it has already received. The individual
claims No. 1 and No. 2, totalling $6,750.00 and $20,981.30 respectively are clearly barred by accord and
satisfaction agreements dated November 10, 1960 and
December 30, 1960, and by the architect's failure to
give any notice of objection to that agreement until
more than eight years after its execution and years
after receiving the benefits from the agreement.
Not only as a matter of law is the plaintiff estopped from challenging the validity of that accord and
satisfaction agreement, this action on these counts is
barred by the statute of limitations and the fact that
im failed to file a timely claim within one year after
those claims accrued as required by law. Further, it
failed to file a suit within one year after the denial
of the claims by the defendants-respondents as required by law.
Claims No. 3 and No. 5 were dismissed by stipulation and are not part of the within litigation.
Claim No. 4 demanding $95,893.15 for alleged
extra expenses because of delay in the construction is
barred as a matter of law by virtue of the clear, unambiguous integration of the parties understanding.
This written contract gave the plaintiff-appellant
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architect, six percent (6%) of the construction cost
as an architectural fee. No time limit in the contract
was specified for the completion of this project; rather,
the contract clearly contemplated the possibility of an
extended construction period. In recognition of this
fact, it granted to the architect additional compensation for inspection expenses over $15,000.00, if the
construction were so delayed. Parol evidence is not
appropriate as suggested by plaintiff under these circumstances and the lower court so properly ruled.
However, claim No. 4 is also properly dismissed
on the grounds that the claim was not timely filed as
required by Utah law and that suit regarding that
claim was not filed within one year of the claim's
denial as required by law.
Claim No. 6 is a claim of $1,250.00 allegedly for
services in preparation of a law suit. Such preparation
and attendance at various court hearings was not subject of the contract extra work clause, which provided
only for services for "extra drafting and other expenses due to the changes ordered by the owner or due
to the delinquency or insolvency of the owner or contractor, or as a result of damage by fire." A few
hours of time was used by the city attorney in discussing with Mr. Beecher an affidavit in which it had a
vested interest by virtue of a contract giving it 10%
of the purchase contract. In fact, by successful prosecution by the city attorney's office, plaintiff-appellant
received over $5,500.00 of additional compensation. The
other time expended was solely for his own benefit and
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curiousity and was not ordered by and was of no benefit to the city or county. The complaint failed to state
a claim to grant the relief prayed; further, no claim or
suit was timely filed regarding it.
Claims No. 6 and No. 7 demand $4,000.00 for
space analysis surveys and square foot drawings and
computations. The lower court properly dismissed these
claims in that the facts clearly show most of the work
related thereto was covered by the accord and satisfaction agreement of November 10 and December 30,
1969. Further, they are clearly barred by the failure
to file a claim with the city or county for a period
exceeding two years and three months from the date
that the claim accrued or arose. They are further barred by failure of the plaintiff-appellant architect to
file suit for more than one year after the claims were
denied as required by Utah law.
Conflict in controversy has now existed between
these parties for a period approaching fifteen years on
the matters subject of this appeal. After approximately two years of trial preparation, after requesting a
pre-trial conference, and after the plaintiff-appellant
had certified to the court that it was prepared to go
to trial, the architect could not factually present a
prima facie case to justify a trial. I t is respectfully
submitted that the provision of Rule 16 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure concerning pre-trial conferences the court was not only justified but required to
give the plaintiff-appellant the relief of a judgment of
dismissal.
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It is respectfully submitted that this court should
affirm the lower court's decision and finally inter the
carcass of this fifteen year old dispute. Each claim is
barred by applicable statutes of limitations and suffers
from multiple other fatal defects.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
ROGER F. CUTLER
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Salt Lake City Corporation
101 City & County Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
R I C H A R D S. S H E P H E R D
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent
Salt Lake County
C-220 Metropolitan Hall of Justice
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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